On May 4, 2023, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled on Fredericksburg attorney Joseph Taylor Brown’s appeal concerning the circuit’s determination that his behavior introduced fresh grounds for divorce, the circuit court’s finding that he violated Rule 1.7(a)(2), and the length and detail of the memorandum order reprimanding Brown for engaging in sexual relations with his client during the representation.
The case is entitled “Joseph Taylor Brown v. Virginia State Bar, ex rel. Sixth District Committee.”
The charges cited Rule 1.7(a)(2) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if there is significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
According to court documents, Brown was publicly reprimanded by the Circuit Court for the County of Spotsylvania on August 25, 2022, for having sexual relations with his client, for whom he was counsel of record in her pending divorce proceeding.
The filing states:
“Between May 6 and 12, 2020, numerous texts were exchanged between Respondent and C.C. Those texts became increasingly sexual in nature. By way of example, on May 10, 2020, Respondent revealed that he was attracted to C.C. on the first day they met in his conference room in 2017. Also on May 10, 2020, C.C. stated in a text to Respondent “You’re grooming me.”
The filing continues:
“On May 12, 2020, Respondent and C.C. met at the Hilton Garden Inn in Fredericksburg. Initially the meeting had been planned to occur at Respondent’s law office because the stated purpose for the meeting was to address and respond to allegations made by a friend of M.C., Mr. Clayman, that C.C. was posting pornography on her social media accounts. Respondent alerted C.C. to Mr. Clayman’s allegations. C.C. denied the allegation and stated, in substance, that her social media accounts are on her phone and she could show Respondent.
However, when Respondent and C.C. met on May 12, 2020, Mt. Clayman’s allegations and C.C.’s social media postings were not addressed. Instead, Respondent and C.C. engaged in sexual activity.”
The filing additionally notes:
“On May 12, 2020, when Respondent was still counsel of record for C.C. in the pending divorce case, Respondent engaged in sexual relations with C.C. Respondent was pursuing his personal interest in having sexual relations with C.C. and that personal interest presented a significant risk that his representation of her would be limited, among other things. Respondent’s sexual relations with C.C. created new or additional grounds for divorce, specifically adultery.”
After a hearing of the matter, a three-judge panel unanimously concluded that Brown shall receive a public reprimand with terms based upon Brown’s violation of the rule of professional conduct as charged.
Brown challenged the three-judge panel’s determination in the divorce case, claiming error in their finding that he introduced a fresh ground against his client, their conclusion that he violated Rule 1.7(a)(2), and their extensive and detailed memorandum order.
On review, the Court concluded that the record supports the circuit court’s determination that Brown violated Rule 1.7(a)(2). The court’s finding that Brown introduced a fault ground for divorce against C.C., along with other contested facts, is also supported by the record. Since the Bar did not seek any further relief on appeal, the court’s decision regarding Rule 2.1 is not addressed. Accordingly, the circuit court’s decision is upheld.
Mr. Joseph Taylor Brown earned a law degree from the Univesity of Richmond School of Law, graduating in 2001. He maintains his law practice in Fredericksburg and has been licensed in Virginia.
A copy of the original filing can be found here.
